Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Australian Digital Forensics Conference

Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events

12-4-2013

Identifying Bugs In Digital Forensic Tools
Brian Cusack
Edith Cowan University

Alain Homewood
Auckland University of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
DOI: 10.4225/75/57b3c3befb86c
11th Australian Digital Forensics Conference. Held on the 2nd-4th December, 2013 at Edith Cowan University, Perth,
Western Australia
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf/120



IDENTIFYINGBUGSINDIGITALFORENSICTOOLS

BrianCusack1,2,AlainHomewood1
1
AucklandUniversityofTechnology,Auckland,NewZealand
2
SecurityResearchInstitute,EdithCowanUniversity,Perth,Australia
brian.cusack@aut.ac.nz,alain.homewood@aut.a.nz



Abstract
Bugscanbefoundinallcodeandtheconsequencesareusuallymanagedthroughupgradereleases,
patches, and restarting operating systems and applications. However, in mission critical systems
complete fall over systems are built to assure service continuity. In our research we asked the
question,whataretheprofessionalrisksofbugsindigitalforensictools?Ourinvestigationreviewed
threehighuseprofessionalproprietarydigitalforensictools,oneinwhichweidentifiedsixbugsand
evaluatedthesebugintermsofpotentialimpactsonaninvestigator’swork.Thefindingsshowthat
yesmajorbrandnamedigitalforensictoolshavesoftwarebugsandthereisroomforimprovement.
Thesebugshadpotential tofrustrate aninvestigator,tocosttime,toloseevidenceandtorequire
compensatorystrategies.Suchsoftwarebugsalsohavethepotentialformaliciousexploitationand
antiforensicuse.
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INTRODUCTION
A software bug is weakness in a computer program either by code or design that produces an
incorrect or unexpected result, or causes it to behave in unintended ways (Garfinkel, 2007). The
research question regards the value of these vulnerabilities for antiforensic hacks or the
implications for the preservation and presentation of evidence (Hilley, 2007). Exploiting software
bugs can occur in many ways. The focus of our interest was fuzzing exploitations. Fuzzing is the
processofprovidingintentionallyinvaliddatatoanapplicationinanattempttotriggeranerroror
fault condition of some kind. This type of activity can be classified as antiforensic as the
consequencescanblockevidence,counterfeitevidence,confoundinvestigation,frustrateprocesses,
and confuse analysis. Code execution is an integral part of software tool functionality and the
associated vulnerabilities require securing. We used fuzzing to create malformed data structures
throughmethodssuchasrandomlyreplacingsinglebytes.Initssimplestformfuzzingcanconsistof
simplyrandomlyreplacingbytesinadatastructure;atits most advanced itrequires manipulating
specific byte locations with knowledge of the properties of a data structure. We used a set of
mutationsthataredesignedtoexploittypicalprogrammingmistakescommonlyfoundinsoftware.
AnexampleofoneofthesemutationsisreplacingasequenceofNULbyteswithrandomvaluesof
thesamelength.FuzzingwasperformedonanumberoffileformatssuchasJPEGimagesandPDF
documents with the goal of detecting problems with the built in file viewers in the forensic tools.
Fuzzing was also performed on file system structures in an attempt to reveal issues with the
methods used by forensic tools to interpret file systems (Sutton, Green, & Amini, 2001; Harris,
2006).


Asecondtechniqueusedwasmanualtargetedmanipulationofdataformats.Targetedmanipulation
is the process of modifying specific portions of a data structure guided with detailed knowledge
about the data structure.  Two data structures were targeted for testing; individual files and file
systemstructures.Individualfilesweretargetedinanattempttoagainlocateissueswithatoolbuilt
infileviewer.Filesystemsandentirediskimageswerealsotargetedinanattempttolocateissues
withthetechniquesusedtoanalysefilesystems.Functionbasedsoftwaretestingusesstandardised
and benchmarked input data but fuzzing addresses the residual risk inherent in such testing.
Importantlyweidentifiedanumberofbugsinseveraldifferenttypesoftoolandthisreportfocuses
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onsixofthosebugsinonetool.Thepaperisstructuredtodeliverabriefbackgroundonsoftware
bugs,thetestingmethods,theresultsandadiscussionoftheantiforensicrisksposed.

TOOLBUGS
Digital forensic investigators typically rely on one or two tools to conduct their investigation. The
relianceonasmallnumberoftoolsisbecauseofcosts,userconfidenceandtherequirementinthe
communitytohavestandardisedtoolsthatcanbetestedandconfirmedtoproducereliableresults
(Guo,Slay,&Beckett,2009).Toolrisktypesfallintothreecategories:failuretovalidatedata,denial
of service attacks and fragile heuristics (Lui & Stach, 2006). The tools risk of improper input
validation before performing a process leads to a common example of a technique that exploits
softwarebyabufferoverflow.Abufferoverflowoccurswhenaprogramiswritingdatatoabufferin
memorybutoverrunsthebuffersboundaryandoverwritestheadjacentmemoryarea.Theresultof
buffer overflow is that the program may exhibit erratic behaviour including crashes and memory
accesserrors.Incaseswherethedatabeingwrittentomemoryisundercontroloftheuseritmay
bepossiblefortheusertocontrolwhatcodeiscurrentlybeingexecutedandtoexecutetheirown
arbitrary code. Many investigators have probably experienced an unexpected crash or erratic
behaviourwhenusingadigitalforensictool;thecrashislikelydueasoftwarebuginthetoolthat
doesn’tproperlyvalidateinputdata.Oneofthemainreasonsfortheexistenceofsoftwarebugsin
digitalforensictoolsisthatdigitalforensictoolsmustbeabletoacquiredatafrommultipletypesof
device and then analyse, search and display thousands of different data formats (Charters, 2009).
Denialofserviceattacksalsooccurwithtoolsandrefertotheabilityofanattackertoexhaustan
availableresourceofmemoryandCPUtime.Oncetheresourcehasbeenexhaustedthentheservice
provided by tool is denied meaning the specific forensic analysis task being performed stops. An
example of a denial of service attack against digital forensic tools that is commonly referred to is
“42.zip”. 42.zip is a small zip file that is 42KB in size; however 42.zip contains multiple levels of
recursively nested zip files inside of itself which when fully extracted contain 4.5PB of data. If the
mountingprocesswastoencounter42.zipthenthesystemwouldkeepextractinguntilitranoutof
resourcessuchasharddrivespaceandmemory.


Fragileheuristicsreferstotheprocessesdigitalforensictoolsusetodeterminethetypeorstructure
ofadataobject.Essentiallydigitalforensictoolsoftenhavetomakeeducatedguessesaboutwhat
typeofdatatheyareprocessingorhowdataisstructured.Forexamplewhenatoolconductsafile
signature analysis it first examines the file extension and file header and then performs a
comparisonwithalistofknownsignatures.Theriskofrelyingonheuristicprocessesisthattheycan
beeasilycircumventedbytoolssuchasTransmogrifyinordertohidefiles.Thereisalsotheriskofa
denial of service attack or file hiding techniques being possible through the creation of a large
numberoffalsepositives.Forexampleanattackercouldcreatealargenumberoftextfilesthatstart
with“PK”.Becausetextfileshavenoheaderafilesignatureanalysisatoolwillreportthetextfilesas
zipfilesandthelargenumberoffalsepositivescouldpreventfunctionalitysuchasafilemountfrom
working effectively or could divert the investigators attention from legitimate zip files containing
relevantevidence(Carrier,2002).

Tool related risks can be mitigated through two main approaches; firstly the use of multiple tools
andsecondlytheproductionofbettertools.Theuseofmultipletoolsisasimplesolutionhowever
the cost in time and money of purchasing tools, training and performing the same work twice
prohibitsmanyinvestigatorsfrombeingabletousemultipletools.Themonetarycostfactorcanbe
reduced by the use of open source forensic tools which have come a long way in terms of
functionalityandusabilityinrecentyears.Opensourcetoolsalsohavethebenefitofanyonebeing
abletofixsoftwarebugsthatposeanantiforensicrisk.Theuseofmultipletoolsalsogreatlyhelps
mitigatetheriskofimproperlyvalidateddata.Howeverthereareonlyalimitednumberofwaysfor
digital forensic tools to perform a task which results in tools sharing common methods and
techniques;theendresultbeingmultipletoolsthatarevulnerabletothesamedenialofserviceand
fragile heuristic attacks. Many antiforensic techniques can be overcome by improving and fixing
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bugs in existing digital forensic tools. Denial of service attacks such as the use of 42.zip should be
intelligently detected and handled by all tools. The heuristic systems behind processes like file
signature analysis can be improved by looking beyond the header and footer of a file and the
identification of known file structures within the file in order to identify its type (Hadnagy, 2010;
Stamm,2010).

TESTCRITERIA
We tested a range of proprietary and open source tools by adopting best practices from the
literature.  The testing data was deliberately constructed to dislodge bugs in the tools. Twenty
malformeddatasetsofimages,email,containers,internetartefacts,windowsfilesandlogfileswere
usedasinputdata.Acceptancespectrumsadaptedfromliteraturewereemployedtodeterminethe
resultsofeachtestcase(seeTable1).

Table1:DefaultAcceptanceSpectrum

Result AcceptanceSpectrum
Pass
Exceedsexpectations
Pass
Meetsexpectations
Fail

Unacceptable

Fail

Criticallyunacceptable

MappedHypothesis
H1:Nosoftwarebugsaredetected.
H2:Softwarebugsaredetectedbuttheydonotpresent
anantiforensicrisk.
H3:Softwarebugsaredetectedthatpresentaminor
antiforensicrisk.
H4: Software bugs are detected that present a critical
antiforensicrisk.


The acceptance spectrums contained a range of possible outcomes for each test case beyond a
simple pass or fail result and further refinements were made to granulate (see Tables 2 & 3). A
numberofreferencesetswerecreatedbyfirstidentifyingabenigninputfileforasubfunction.A
reference set was then generated by creating a number of malformed files based off of the input
file. The benign files were either taken from an existing image of forensic corpora or by manually
creating benign files and in this way the reference sets all contain various numbers of files at five
specific malformation percentages being 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.5%, 1% and 2%. A range of malformation
percentageswaschosentogenerateawiderangeofpossiblemalformationsinthereferencesets.
One file type may generate an error condition at a malformation percentage of 0.1%; however
anotherfiletypemayonlygenerateanerrorconditionatamalformationpercentageof2%.These
metricsgavefurtherinsightintoexpectedperformances.

Table2:Summaryofreferencesets

ReferenceSetID
RSIMAGE01

Contents
MalformedBMP,GIF,JPGandPNGimages

RSEMAIL01

MalformedPSTemailcontainers

RSEMAIL02

MalformedNSFemailcontainers

RSEMAIL03

MalformedMBOXemailcontainers

RSEMAIL04

MalformedDBXemailcontainers

RSCONTAINER01

MalformedZIPfilecontainers

RSCONTAINER02

MalformedGZIPfilecontainers
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RSCONTAINER03

MalformedTARfilecontainers

RSCONTAINER04

MalformedRARfilecontainers

RSCONTAINER05

MalformedBZIP2filecontainers

RSINTERNET01

MalformedFirefoxhistory/bookmarkdatabases

RSINTERNET02

MalformedInternetExplorerhistorydatabases

RSINTERNET03

MalformedOperahistorydatabases

RSINTERNET04

MalformedSafarihistorydatabases

RSINTERNET05

MalformedChromehistorydatabases

RSWINDOWS01

MalformedWindowsLinkfiles

RSWINDOWS02

MalformedWindowsRecycleBin(INFO2)records

RSLOG01

MalformedWindowsLegacyEventLogs

RSLOG02

MalformedWindowsEventLogs

Table3:Testrequirements

RequirementID
EC.EP.01

Description
The“ThumbnailCreation”subfunctionshall beabletohandle malformed
imageswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition

EC.EP.02

The“FindEmail”subfunctionshallbeabletohandlemalformedemailfiles
withoutgeneratinganerrorcondition

EC.EP.03

The “Expand Compound Files” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedcompoundfileswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition

EC.EP.04

The “Find Internet Artifacts” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedinternetartefactswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition

EC.EP.05

The “Windows Artifact Parser” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedWindowsartefactswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition

EC.EP.06

The “Windows Event Log Parser” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedWindowseventlogswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition
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THERESULTS
Ourreportherefocusesononetoolasanillustrationofwhatmaybeexpectedwhentestingdigital
forensic tools. The outcome shows that the tool performs inconsistently and across the different
tools different performances were found. In this instance two tests exceed expectations and four
wereunacceptableontheadoptedacceptancespectrum(seeFigure1).Thequestionthenarisesas
totheimplicationsofsuchinconsistencies.Wefurtherresolvedthetooltestsintoissuesthatwere
identifiedduringtesting(seeTable4).Principallyadominantsetofoccurrencesshowednoissues
but disturbingly a greater number of occurrences reported problems for the uninterrupted use of
the tool. These included a high number ofcrashes indicating that abstract complexities that could
notberesolvedbythesoftware.Inadditionbufferoverrunswerefoundinlargefilesandanumber
of unexplained exits from analysis were noted. When challenged by the malformed input data
internalerrorsoccurredthateitherfrozethescreenorerrormessageswerereported.Theseresults
showthatfuzzingisabletodisclosebugswithincodeandthatthestabilityofdigitalforensictools
maybequestioned.
Table4:Summaryofacceptancespectrumdeterminations

TestCase
TC.01

Result
Pass

AcceptanceSpectrum
Exceedsexpectations

TC.02

Fail

Unacceptable

TC.03

Fail

Unacceptable

TC.04

Fail

Unacceptable

TC.05

Pass

Exceedsexpectations

TC.06

Fail

Unacceptable


Further analysis showed that throughout the testing there were four distinct types of issues were
identified.  The most common type of issue seen was a complete crash resulting in the Windows
operating system presenting an error message. The error message indicates that the operating
system has detected a fatal exception has occurred in the tool executable. Windows performed a
memory dump of the application’s memory and then ended the executable.  A crash has the
potential to be a significant issue for an application and could result in antiforensic risks such as
codeexecutionwhichcouldleadtocompromisingthesystemandevidence.IntestcaseTC.03while
processingreferencesetRSCONTAINER01thetoolexitedunexpectedlywithoutanerrormessage
appearingfromeitherthetoolorWindowsOS.Aninternalerrormessageoccurredduringtestcase
TC.06whileprocessingreferencesetRSLOG02.Aninternalerrormessageisanindicationthatthe
toolhasencounteredanexceptionandhasbeenabletohandleitgracefullywithoutneedingtoend
the executable. In this particular case it remained in working state with reduced functionality.
However,testingwasabandonedduringtestcaseTC.02whileprocessingreferencesetRSEMAIL04
due to the creation of unusually large cache files. In the case of RSEMAIL04 the logical evidence
files being created were exceptionally large. The issue seen with RSEMAIL04 is likely due to the
manipulation of internal data structures in a DBX file by the fuzzing process. The main risk of the
creationoflargecachefilesisthataninvestigatorwillrunoutofroomtostorethecachefilesand
theevidenceprocessingmayneedtobecancelledandrepeated.Thisagainisatimecost.
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IssuesIdentified
10
9
8
7
6
5
Issues

4
3
2
1
0
NoIssues

Crash

Largecache
files

Unexpected Internalerror
exit


Figure1:Summaryoftypesofissues


IMPLICATIONSANDCOUNTERMEASURES
Theacceptancespectrumconceptwasadoptedtodeterminetheseverityofantiforensicriskandto
assurethatantiforensicrisksarenotincorrectlyjudgedtobeharmlessorcriticalduetoinsufficient
differentiation. The hypothesis testing in the case revealed that the majority of the test cases
performedweredeterminedtobeunacceptable.Essentiallythesoftwarebugsdetectedhavebeen
determinedtofallinthemiddleoftheacceptancespectrumandpresentaminorantiforensicrisk.
Theresultisgoodfromthepointofviewthatthesoftwarebugshavenotbeenincorrectlylabelled
asharmlessorcritical.Howevertheresultisultimatelyunsatisfyingindeterminingtheactualanti
forensic implications. The acceptance spectrum result does nothing to inform investigators if they
should be concerned about a particular software bug. For example one of the bugs was analysed
furtherandshowntobeacodeexecutionvulnerabilitywhiletherestofthebugsremainedasminor
risks. Care should be taken to understand if a risk has been accurately represented or if further
analysiscoulddetermineiftheriskhasbeenunderoroverstated.

The most prevalent issue identified in the case was seven instances of crashing where the tool
suffered a fatal error that it couldn’t recover from. Two instances of the similar issues of internal
errors and exiting unexpectedly were also identified. A suspect knowing they are about to be
investigated and knowing the basics of the forensic process might deliberately plant several
malformedcompoundfilesonhiscomputer.Aninvestigatorcouldspendaconsiderableamountof
timerunningtoolsonlytoencounteradeliberatelymalformedcompoundfilethatcausesacrash.
Theinvestigatorhasnowlostasignificantamountofprocessingtimeandhasbeenpreventedfrom
using the Evidence Processor functionality to automatically expand compound files. If the
investigatorwastotryusingtheEvidenceProcessoragaintheywouldencounteranothercrashand
loseevenmoretime.Atthisstagetheinvestigatorisforcedtotakecountermeasurestohandlethe
malformedcompoundfiles.Thesimplestoptionwouldbetomanuallyexpandthecompoundfiles
onebyonesothatlessworkislostifamalformedcompoundfileisencountered.Anotherapproach
istousethedebuggingfeaturesofthesoftwareandworkwiththesoftwarevendortoidentifyand
fix the software bug. As an immediate solution the software vendor could possibly assist in
identifyingtheproblemfilessothattheycanbeisolated.Athirdoptionistouseanalternativetool
toperformtheanalysisontheexhibitwiththehopethatdifferenttoolswillhavedifferentsoftware
bugs.
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Byanalysingthiscrashscenariowecanidentifyanumberofdifferenttypesofriskfactorspresent.
The most obvious risk factor is a tool risk that was due to a failure to validate data. The digital
forensic tool has failed to validate the data it is processing from the compound file and this has
resulted in a fatal error occurring. There is also an element of process risk that shows reliance on
standardisedprocessesmakesiteasiertotargetantiforensicattacks.Expandingcompoundfilesis
goingtobepartofmanypeople’sforensicprocessandthereforeitbecomesapromisingfunctionto
targetwithanantiforensicattack.Anumberofcountermeasureswerepresentedinthescenario
however these counter measures are dependent on human risk factors and an investigator who
hadn’tencounteredsimilarissuesbeforemightsimplykeeprerunningthetoolandexpectittowork
thesecondtime.Thesoftwarebugsidentifiedthatcausedacrash,unexpectedexitorinternalerror
presentanantiforensicriskthatis easilyidentifiablebyaninvestigator.When thetoolcrashesin
themiddleofrunningtheEvidenceProcessorit’sobviousthatsomethinghasgonewrongandsome
actionneedsbetakentoremedythesituation.Therewasonesoftwarebugidentifiedthatisn’tas
obvious. The “Find Email” function of the Evidence Processor results in the creation the of large
cachefiles.The“FindEmail”functionparsesemailcontainerfilesandextractstheindividualemails
out to a logical evidence file to allow for further analysis. A software bug was identified with the
processing of DBX email containers which resulted in unusually large logical evidence files being
created.Inthetestcasethereferencesetof3GBofDBXemailcontainersexpandedtofulla1.8TB
drivebeforetheprocesswascancelledafter24hoursofprocessingtime.

Ifsuchfilesweretobeencounteredinactualinvestigationtherewouldbenoindicationofwhathad
happeneduntiltheyrunoutofavailableharddrivespace.Theantiforensicimplicationsaresimilar
to a crash in that the investigator loses a significant amount of time. However the loss of time is
potentially much larger as the investigator is not immediately notified that something has gone
wrong.Alsotheinvestigatorhastospendadditionaltimediagnosingtheissuetofigureoutthatthe
toolhascreatedlargecachefilesandthentocleanuptheconsequences.Theinvestigatorcanuse
similarcountermeasurestothoseusedtocounteracrashhoweverthecreationoflargecachefiles
falls into the category of denial of service attacks where the investigator is being prevented from
usingaresource.Thesoftwarebugsidentifieddonotcurrentlyposeasignificantthreattoevidential
integrity or the security of examiner machines. Although there may be potential for more severe
antiforensicrisktheonlydemonstrableriskisthatofdisruptingorpreventinginvestigationsfrom
occurring.Thereareviablecountermeasuresavailabletotheantiforensicrisksidentifiedhowever
thesemaybeexpensiveintermsofexaminationtimeandcostofadditionalresourcesandtools.

CONCLUSION
Our research question arose because of an unproven concern that bugs in software could be
exploitedforantiforensicactivity.Afurtherworrywasthepotentialmisrepresentationordamage
toevidencebyvulnerabilitiesinbothopensourceandproprietarytools.Theresearchrananumber
oftestcasesinwhichdeliberatelymalformeddatawasinputintodigitalforensictoolsinanattempt
tolocatesoftwarebugs.Thesoftwarebugsoncelocatedwerethenanalysedandthepotentialfor
differentexploitationsidentified.Weweresuccessfulindiscoveringanumberofsoftwarebugsthat
resulted in unusual behaviour from different tools including behaviours that prevented evidence
acquisition,crashingwhilesearchingordisplayingincorrectevidenceaswellasevidencenotbeing
displayed.
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